Israeli/Palestinian Conflict Turkey


Erdogan: We Turks are making an Islamic comeback,
addressing the Jewish problem is pivotal to our success

The IHH organized and funded “Flotilla of the Huns” was a Turkish attempt to reassert itself as the key player in the Muslim Middle east, and perhaps even in the whole Islamic world.
The befuddled media and politicians in the West fell over themselves in their rush to condemn the Jewish state for protecting itself against the possibility of weapons being smuggled into the Gaza Strip. What is now known by the IDF, is that active terrorist operatives were found on board the Mavi Marmara, as well as IHH leader, Bülent Yildirim, who is unconcerned about protecing human life, the man is an open Hamas supporter and no humanitarian.
So the Fattah are worried about Turkish support for Hamas, they should be, but lets not fool ourselves here, there isn’t any difference between Hamas’ end game for Israel and Fattah’s, on that score they’re in full agreement.
This fight between Hamas and Fattah is an in-fight between competing gangs, in much the same way as the Bloods and the Crips fight over turf in California. So it’s all the same which side in the fight the Turks line up with, the key trouble here is, that the Turks are in fact taking sides. KGS

NOTE: Oh and the Iranians are happy to compete for Islamic dominence (read= hearts and minds) as well, nothing like jumping up and down on a Jew to get the Muslim street rooting for you. “Gaza blockade: Iran offers escort to next aid convoy

Turkey’s support of Hamas worries PA

The Palestinian Authority is concerned about Turkey’s increased support for Hamas, a PA official in Ramallah said on Monday.
The official said that the PA leadership was “unhappy” with Turkey’s policy toward Hamas, especially with regard to pressure to lift the blockade on the Gaza Strip unconditionally.
“Turkey’s policy is emboldening Hamas and undermining the Palestinian Authority,” the official told The Jerusalem Post.
“Of course we want to see the blockade lifted, but Hamas must also end its coup in the Gaza Strip and accept an Egyptian proposal for achieving reconciliation with Fatah.”

4 Responses

  1. There is ample evidence of the fact that Muslims historically have been continuously at each others’ throats when it comes to religious dissent and the gradual formation of religiously heterodox sub-divisions within Islam. However, the animosity between Muslims in general also makes its presence felt along ethnic-cultural fault lines, which to the average outsider in the West seems less evident. To put it bluntly, there is a type of racism involved, or ethnocentrism or whatever one likes to call it. Islam started out as an internationalist ideology, spread through the violent coercion perpetrated by Arabs on non-Arabs. After Islam consolidated its hegemony in Arabia, the first non-Arabs that would collectively be subjugated to Arab Islamism were the Persian Sassanids.
    Ever since, Persians (as a distinct cultural and ethnic group) have traditionally been particularly reviled by Arabs, not in the least because the advent of the Persian Safavid Empire initiated a coercive, violent program to obliterate Sunni Islam in Persia with the intent of subjugating people to Shia Islam. (up to this point, Persia was mainly Sunni !) This process was enforced top-down by the first Safavid ruler Ismail I and his successors, and today is still deeply rooted in the collective fear Arab Sunnis in the vicinity have of being converted to Shia Islam. The historical irony is quite poignant: Arab invaders spread the Only True Faith in Persia by the sword, only to find out later that Persian society met with the same disproportionate violence in a bid to superimpose Shia Islam on Sunni Persians. This reality is reflected in Iran today: Sunnis are a very small minority in Iran, most of them are ethnic Kurds, Baloch or Arabs, and they live mainly on the fringes of Iranian society. The main ethnicities in Iran, the Persians and the (Turkic) Azeri are Shiite, and they wield the most power. The paranoid fear of Sunni Arabs can be found (among others) in Three Whom God Should Not Have Created: Persians, Jews, and Flies, the name of a racist Iraqi government pamphlet widely published during the era of Saddam Hussein.The author, Khairallah Talfah, was an Iraqi Ba'ath Party official, and the maternal uncle and father-in-law of Saddam Hussein. He first wrote the ten-page pamphlet in 1940.In 1981, following the start of the Iran–Iraq War, the Iraqi government republished it, and the Iraqi Ministry of Education distributed the propaganda as part of a textbook for school-children.The work describes Persians as "animals God created in the shape of humans", Jews as a "mixture of dirt and the leftovers of diverse people", and flies as poor misunderstood creatures "whom we do not understand God's purpose in creating”. The mere fact that Jews and Persians are named in the same context, also refers directly to the mutual understanding and repect the Achaemenian rulers and the Jews had for one another’s religious traditions. (when the Persians conquered the Babylonians). Coincidentally, Saddam Hussein intertwined the Baath ideology in Iraq firmly with a profound interest in the history of Ancient Mesopotamia, more specifically the legacy of Babylonian and Assyrian warrior kings.
    Another historical irony imposed on the Arabs was of course the advent and consolidation of the Ottoman Empire, which made many Arabs subservient to Turkish rule. This in turn led to opposition of Muhammad Ahmad bin Abd Allah (otherwise known as the Mahdi) a Sufi sheikh in Sudan who, on June 29, 1881, proclaimed himself as the messianic redeemer of the Islamic faith. His proclamation came during a period of widespread resentment among the Sudanese Arab population of the oppressive policies of the Turco-Egyptian rulers. Both North Sudan and Egypt fell nominally under the rule of the Ottoman empire through the local Khedive (a Turkish title largely equivalent to the English word viceroy). The administration was mainly supervised by the Egyptians.

  2. This led the Mahdi to proclaim jihad by declaring
    “I am the Mahdi, the Successor of the Prophet of God. Cease to pay taxes to the infidel Turks and let everyone who finds a Turk kill him, for the Turks are infidels”
    Eventually this led to the establishment of a Mahdist Jihad state in Sudan, based on pure Islam as the Mahdi envisioned it, and the subsequent British involvement in Sudan, intent on obliterating the fundamentalist regime his successor tried to consolidate. The Mahdi state came to an end shortly after the the Battle of Omdurman. (1898) Arab nationalism resurfaced in the 20th century mainly as a reaction to Turkish nationalism. It is based on the premise that nations from Morocco to the Arabian peninsula are united by their common linguistic, cultural and historical heritage. Some Westerners erroneously assume that Turkish nationalism was shaped by Kemal Atatürk, whereas in fact Turkish nationalism already existed well before Atatürk came to power. The only thing he did was actually modernize Turkish society to the point that Turkish nationalism became associated with a secular view of society.
    Turkish nationalism became pitted against Arab nationalism when the geopolitical tide started turning against the Ottomans as a consequence of their allegiance to the Central Powers during the First World War. Which in turn led to the geopolitical logic of the British to make sure the Ottomans would find themselves bogged down on two fronts, rather than just the one. Which of course is why T.E. Lawrence was sent out to convince the leaders of the Arab Revolt to co-ordinate their actions in support of British strategy, the result of which we still live to regret in the West today. Arab nationalism is not a monolith, however, it is split into factions that either conceive nationalism as founded on the Religion of Islam, or either lay emphasis on the secular aspect of nationalism. Basically the same also goes for Turkish nationalism. Whereas Turkish prime minister Erdogan focuses primarily on Islam, this doesn’t necessarily imply he has denounced Turkish nationalism in the ‘Ottoman sense’ of the word.
    Both anti-Turkish and anti-Persian sentiments have a long tradition in the Arab collective psyche. Not only did many Arabs fall under the rule of the Ottoman Turks, coincidentally Iran also has a history of local rulers not being indigenous Persians, but in actual fact belonging to Turkic tribes invading the country from nearby Central Asia. (mainly nowadays Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) Which has led to the historical notion of ‘Turco-Persian dynasties’, denoting the rule of mainly Turkmen leaders who established a dynasty in Persia and as a consequence became Persianized themselves bottom-up, rather than imposing Turkish cultural identity top-down. This is the main reason why the Arabisation of Persia prematurely stopped dead in its tracks. Indigenous rule was only re-established with the founding of the Pahlavi dynasty after many centuries of Turco-Persian rule. Ismail I, who instigated the enforced conversion of Sunni Persians to Shia Islam, was not the first Turco-Persian Shah, neither would he turn out to be the last one. (coincidentally, Ismail I also fought against the Ottoman Empire)

  3. It is quite interesting to note that Turkey and Iran are forging bonds over mutual economic interests. Turks and Persians share a common history in Iran, where Azeris (or Azerbaijanis) are a significant majority. (ayatollah Khamenei for instance is an Azeri, like many other religious figureheads in Iran) Azeris are culturally not all that different to Turks, as a matter of fact, they more or less speak the same language. (although Azeris, both in Iran and the neighbouring state of Azerbaijan are majority Shia Muslims)

    From the historical context, it seems rather logical that there seems to be much less animosity between Turks and Persians, than there is between Turks and Arabs or Persians and Arabs separately. As a consequence, the Arabs in the vicinity and on the Arabian peninsula are starting to get equally weary of Turkey’s long-term intentions in the Middle East, which is comparable to the distrust Arabs traditionally have felt towards the Persians. It is particularly apparent that Fatah takes the forefront in voicing concerns over the pending re-affirmation of Turkish nationalism (regardless of it being religiously inspired or rooted in secular society) Whereas Hamas has developped its brand of Arab nationalism on profound Jihad ideology, Fatah more or less takes a different approach, and realizes that ‘secular’ Arab nationalism will turn gradually marginalized as a consequence of foreign Islamic regimes butting in. Hamas has deliberately seeked support of both Iran and now Turkey, not because they like cosying up to Turks or Shiite Persians all that much, but simply on a pragmatical basis: Arab countries in the vicinity are hardly likely to support Hamas, because they fear the growing popularity of the Islamic Brotherhood and the destabilisation of their own ‘moderate’ regimes in Egypt and Jordan should such extremists gain an expanding foothold in these countries. Hamas has aligned itself firmly with the Iranians and the Turks, because both are willing and able to help Hamas logistically and militarily. Hamas full well realises that they have allied themselves with two regional powers (for the time being) that more than likely want to further their own interests in the region. But this is not the main issue to them. Such an allegiance can only be considered to be temporary. That is, temporary to the point where Hamas has achieved its objective and doesn’t require their help anymore. So therefore, it makes perfect sense to Hamas to unite temporarily with Turkish and Persian Islamists on the pretext ‘What unites us is Islam’. Hamas has allied itself with Iranians and Turks on the premise that pragmatical considerations should trump the ‘Arab nationalism’, at least for the time being. A classical example of the geopolitical cynicism that simply translates as ‘The enemy of my enemy is my friend’. Which is perfectly justifiable from Hamas’ point of view, as long as neither Turks nor Persians gain an actual foothold in Gaza. Something that Hamas will be trying to avoid at all cost. The mere fact that Erdogan has followed suit on Iranians’ intent to meddle in the region, clearly suggests that Turkey is as much jockeying for influence in the Arab world as the Iranians have been doing for quite a while now. Given the historical context, it would be quite safe to say that on the Arabian peninsula Arabs are getting more and more anxious of these developments, seeing as both Turkish expansionism and Persian Shiification are particularly abhorrent to most Sunni Arabs in general. Considering the expanding influence of Shia Islam in the official government of Iraq, and the fact that Erdogan has started meddling in the Gaza issue, there is a more or less resurgent fear in the Arab world that a type of mutual agreement might exist between Turks and Persians to divide the Middle East among them, to the detriment of Arab Sunni Muslims. Or simply put, a new Turco-Persian Axis that would like to grasp every opportunity to wield all power in the Middle East.

  4. Again, the irony of such a thing happening, is quite apparent. From the onset it became clear that Arabs would emphasize and impose their superiority over other ethnicities by way of Islam. This still has significant repercussions on the global Muslim community today. Muslims are required to recite the Quran literally in Arabic, seeing as the Word of Allah can not be corrupted in content or spirit by using another language. Which means that native speakers of Turkish, Persian, Urdu, Panjabi, Malaysian, Indonesian, Somali,…and the like therefore recite the Quran in a language they fundamentally do not understand. And of course language in itself is probably one of the most important factors in trying to determine the specific sense of personal identity one has as belonging to a particular larger cultural entity altogether. Pan-Arabism therefore is a core concept of Islam itself. Which is why Arabs today have a more or less justified fear that once again, they might end up subservient to the rule of ethnic Turks/Persians. Plus a latent fear to become coerced into Shia Islam, particularly regarding those who fear that they will fall under the realm of Shia Iran in a Turco-Persian sphere of influence.

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