Keeping the flame hot.
Andy Bostom, stalwart friend and colleague of Diana’s, steps up to the plate and lends his expertise as only he can, and applies the pressure exactly where it’s needed. The facts mentioned here by Bostom, courtesy of Diana West as Andy attests, knocks the third leg from the three legged stool occupied by Ron Radosh and his ‘unassailable knowledge’ of U.S. history during the Rooselvelt years of WWII.
NOTE: Great work Andy, Diana’s book is a treasure trove of facts and knowledge, ready to use for those who actually read her work and understand what they’re reading, without the weight of preconception, arrogance and massive ego.
Suvorov’s meticulous 2008 assessment of Stalin’s machinations for a quarter century, before and during World War II—which, again, validates Baldwin’s immediate post-World War II observations—opens with this ironic comparison of the Soviet Communist dictator, and his German Nazi counterpart, Hitler:
Hitler’s actions were seen by the world as the greatest of crimes, while Stalin’s actions were considered by the world as a struggle for peace and progress. The world hated Hitler, and commiserated with Stalin. Hitler conquered half of Europe, and the rest of the world declared war against him. Stalin conquered half of Europe, and the world sent him greetings. To ensure that Hitler could not hold on to the conquered European countries, the West sank German ships, bombed German cities, and then landed a massive and powerful army on the European continent. To enable Stalin to conquer and hold on to the other half of Europe, the West gave Stalin hundreds of warships, thousands of war planes and tanks, hundreds of thousands of the world’s best war vehicles, and millions of tons of its best fuel, ammunition, and supplies…For me, Hitler remains a heinous criminal. But if Hitler was a criminal, it does not all follow that Stalin was his innocent victim, as Communist propaganda portrayed him before the world.
Communism, Stalin, and the Great American Mistakes of World War II
Hanson W. Baldwin (d. 1991), was a military-affairs editor for The New York Times, who authored over a dozen books on military and naval history and policy. Baldwin, a graduate of the United States Naval Academy, joined The Times in 1929, and in 1943 won a Pulitzer Prize for his World War II reporting from the Pacific.
Before retiring from The Times in 1968, Baldwin reported on the strategy, tactics and weapons of war in Korea, Vietnam, the Middle East and other theaters. Earlier, after covering the European and Pacific battles of World War II, as well as the immediate postwar transition period, so astutely, Hanson Baldwin had already earned recognition as one of the nation’s leading authorities on military and naval affairs.
In 1950, Baldwin published a pellucid World War II post-mortem strategic assessment monograph of 114 pp., entitled, Great Mistakes of the War. Baldwin’s summary analysis identifies the four “great—and false—premises, certainly false in retrospect and seen by some to be false at the time,” as the following:
1. That the Politburo had abandoned (with the ostensible end of the Communist International) its policy of a world Communist revolution and was honestly interested in the maintenance of friendly relations with capitalist governments
2. That “Joe” Stalin was a “good fellow” and we could “get along with him.” This was primarily a Rooseveltian policy and was based in part on the judgments formed by Roosevelt as a result of his direct and indirect contacts with Stalin during the war. This belief was shaken in the last months of Roosevelt’s life, partly by the Soviet stand on Poland.
3. That Russia might make a separate peace with Germany. Fear of this dominated the waking thoughts of our politico-strategists throughout all the early phases of the war, and some anticipated such an eventuality even after our landing in Normandy.
4. That Russian entry into the war against Japan was either: a) essential to victory, or b) necessary to save thousands of American lives. Some of our military men clung to this concept even after the capture of the Marianas and Okinawa.