In my personal opinion, if Hitler’s Germany had never attacked the Soviet Union, Stalin would have never lifted a finger to liberate any of the Nazi’s death camps where 6 million Jews perished. In my opinion, it’s a fluke of history, that the Soviets, (with already one massive genocide under their belt and understood what the Germans were doing, and applauded them) are now considered liberators.
According to historian George Watson, Marx and his colleagues were the first to contemplate the genocide of certain ethnic/social and political groups in order to pave the way for the modern socialist state. They believed that they simply had to be done away with. Hitler knew his Marxist theory, and the marxist planners of the time would have understood and identified with why he mass murdered a people deemed a danger to the state.
NOTE: Stalin never once denounced Hitler’s anti-Jewish policies. (If anyone can find any such denouncement at all, or at least that predates the Nazi attack on the USSR, let me know)
Communism and ultra-National Socialism are both an evil scourge on this earth, and will continue to be a danger in the future, as long as socialism itself hasn’t been fully discredited. It all stems from its basic roots. Statist Marxist collectivism.
Appendiz B: Stalin’s Blind Spot
By Daniel Pipes
Over the years Stalin had taken many steps to win the Nazis’ confidence. As the German ambassador in Moscow correctly reported back, “Stalin has set himself the goal of preserving the Soviet Union from a conflict with Germany.” Already in 1938, during the Czechoslovak crisis, he seemed eager to show the Nazi leadership that no Soviet forces were moving toward Czechoslovakia. He went out of his way punctiliously to fulfill every commitment made in the non-aggression pact. In 1940, as Nazi forces rolled west, he adopted an anti-French and anti-British line. Soviet intelligence agents in Germany had to work under a uniquely restrictive set of instructions, while Stalin passed on some of the warnings he received (including at least one from Churchill) to the Germans. So complete was Stalin’s goodwill that full trains loaded with Soviet goods were entering Nazi-held territory even as the German assault began (and despite the Germans’ having stopped making deliveries months before).
In the spring of 1941, Stalin took many steps to demobilize Soviet opinion. Anti-Nazi statements had already ceased entirely, earlier materials were withdrawn from circulation, friendship was publicly declared, and Soviet citizens of German origins were released from incarceration. A public statement on 14 June rejected talk of a German invasion as “clumsy fabrications,” then asserted that “the rumors that Germany intends to violate the Pact and attack the Soviet Union are completely groundless, while the recent transfer of German troops, having completed their operations in the Balkans, to the eastern and northern parts of Germany must be assumed to have to do with other motives unconnected to Soviet-German relations.” Time and again, Stalin’s words, and those of his underlings, emphasized not the reality of over three million hostile soldiers perched on the frontier, but the importance of doing nothing that might “provoke” them. To an assistant Stalin wrote, “Hitler shouldn’t get the idea that all we’re doing is preparing for war with him.” The Soviet populace, battered into taking very seriously everything their superiors told them, understood such statements to mean that war would not take place.
NOTE: Stalin was a big believer in Hitler.