NYC Islamonazi jihad terror attack: “Lone Wolf” or direct from command central …..?


Four years on after the Boston bombing massacre, and the concept of ”individual terrorism” (a.k.a. lone wolf) is still misunderstood as ever…



What is totally misunderstood of course, is the Islamic terrorist strategy of decentralizing their command structure which after 9/11 proved very costly to the al-Qaida terror network. Such a rigid network left far too many breadcrumbs for investigators to follow, they needed another way to approach their goals of sowing mayhem and murder but leaving other sleeper cells (consisting of a single person or multiple members) undetected by law enforcement. They found a way, thanks in large part to the ”al Suri Strategy”.


When I say ”lone wolf” I’m talking about either a single person or a small number in unrelated cells, they only need to check online to receive any generalized orders and plans on how to carry something out. More likely than not, these ”individual” terrorists are in league with others, but in a way in which they can carry out individual roles separate from one another to ensure the success of an attack, being more likely to defeat, or at least highly frustrate law enforcement in their investigations of the aftermath. It also allows for complete independent singular acts of terror as well.


NOTE: Just think of it as independent cells of either one or more actors with licenses to murder independently from terror central. I know that I keep beating the drum over this but it’s highly crucial to understand the strategy behind the tactics employed, in order to formulate the best counter-strategy in defeating it.


Online Jihadi ‘Mein Kampf’ Urging: ‘Attack Sporting Events’

The global jihadi masterminds endorse a new style of operation, particularly for those in the non-Muslim world arena: small cells, few connections, low cost munitions and high density, high profile crowds. “It’s the al Suri Strategy come home to roost.”


A man who was involved at the very start of the global jihad movement, who was a colleague as well as strategic rival to Osama bin Laden, whose efforts have been linked to the 7/7 bombings in London, the ’04 train bombings in Madrid, possibly to a Paris metro bombing way back in 1995 and even perhaps to the 09/11 bombings, is certainly someone we all should know about.  And while learning about him, it will be useful to consider whether his legacy connects to the Tsarnaev Boston Terror Bombings. Because by all knowledgeable estimates, this is the man who conceived of, trained others for, and wrote the manual on the modern global Islamic jihadi war against the West.  And the most recent battlefield in that war was the finish line in Boston.




His name is Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, although he’s also known as abu Musab al Suri (the Syrian).  Perhaps his most significant contributions to the cause of global jihad was his insistence that the old-style al Qaeda, with its rigid hierarchical structure, was a disaster for the movement and had to be jettisoned in favor of a different strategy.  In his 1600 page manifesto, al Suri stressed the need for the global jihadi movement to create a new fighting style focused on “individual terrorism.”


This innovation, also known as “leaderless jihad,” is a strategy designed to escape detection. Al Suri advised followers not to have cells or “brigades” larger than ten members, and ideally the cells would be in the single digits.  He also advocated that jihadists use the Internet and other methods to gather their information to conduct attacks. Those unwilling to embrace his strategy before and in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, have now largely become believers, whether by necessity or by revelation.


But perhaps al Suri’s greatest significance to those of us still reeling from the horrors of the Boston Marathon bombings, is advice he offered in this magnum opus, written while on the run between 2001 and 2005, “The Call for Global Islamic Resistance.” It is available online.


In CGIR al Suri urged his followers to select places for terrorist attacks which could produce maximum carnage for minimum cost. For example, he wrote, “sports competitions attract thousands of spectators and television cameras.” He also suggested local sleeper cells focus on oil fields and transportation systems – think of recent events in Algeria and Canada. The CGIR is considered “the textbook of home-grown terrorism”; it has also been referred to as the “Jihadi Mein Kampf.”

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