It’s part of the overall game plan, dislodge the U.S. from its super power preeminence and allow what ever takes its place free reign.
I can never quite tell if what we’re seeing from the Obama administration is ineptitude coupled with a peculiar, triangulated ideological moralism, or if it’s something else (it’s hard to even say what). It seems unlikely to me that there was no one – no one at all – involved in the administration’s deliberations on this who understood the ramifications for the 1979 accord and Middle East stability in general. But if there was someone, how did things get done in this careless, haphazard manner?
Whither Camp David?
By Jennifer Dyer
In deciding the famous case between two women claiming the same child, King Solomon propounded his “splitting the baby” solution because he knew there would be no need to actually cut the baby in two. It would be clear from the claimants’ responses who the real mother was.
The Obama administration, by contrast, makes “splitting the baby” a regular feature of its policies. This is invariably a bad idea. At best, you end up with two pieces of a dead baby: something no one can use, everyone will be upset over, and that gives at least one party to your compromise nothing else to lose.
The latest instance of splitting the baby is the administration’s decision to impose a putatively friendly, encouraging, partial suspension of aid to Egypt, as a method of rebuking the Egyptians for ousting Mohammed Morsi, without cutting off aid altogether.
If the Obama administration thinks this will be read by the Egyptian people, or by aspirants to democratic government across the Middle East, as a blow for their interests, it could hardly be more comprehensively wrong. Twenty million Egyptians took to the streets only a matter of weeks ago because they wanted desperately to kick Morsi out. In theory, he was elected by fair means in 2012. But his regime had quickly become intolerably despotic.
The Muslim Brotherhood is regarded with fear and alarm by moderates and the apolitical, as well as by democratizers, throughout the region. Its prospective victims see nothing good in the idea that the U.S. government may tie foreign aid to a nation’s willingness to accept the Muslim Brotherhood in the halls of government power – or, indeed, to a nation’s willingness to endure without recourse the results of an election, no matter what those results are. It is by no means an effective advertisement for constitutional government, to imply that it means a people must submit to seeing their neighbors’ churches burned down, or their own livelihoods and their free press outlets mowed under by sharia enforcers. The benefit of consensual, constitutional government is supposed to be that those things don’t happen to the people.
Obama is already seen by too many in the Middle East as backing the Muslim Brotherhood. This latest move will only reinforce that dangerous perception. Unfortunately, it also throws into question America’s current attitude toward the investment we made in the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, in which control of the Sinai Peninsula was returned to Egypt and the two nations agreed to demilitarize it and observe confidence-building forms of consultation over its security.
A key element of that agreement, proposed in the consultations at Camp David in 1978, was the U.S. investment in the military posture of both nations. Washington doesn’t arm Egypt just because we like Egyptians and think they’re great, although of course we do. We arm Egypt as part of our commitment to the regional-stability vehicle that is the peace between Egypt and Israel.