Harry Hopkins is one of the key characters researched in Diana’s book, American Betrayal, who she carefully lays out as the Soviet’s top spy and influence peddler in the United States, let alone within the US government, most importantly as adviser to FDR.
When Harry Met Ivan (And They Disagreed Over “Joe”…Stalin)
August 24th, 2013 by Andrew Bostom
US Army “Communist Specialist” Col. Ivan Yeaton Recognized Harry Hopkins’s Pro-Soviet Perfidy
Would the followers of the Rasputin of the White House…would these apostles of the [Rexford] Tugwellian philosophy, which would roll up its sleeves and make America over—use this war as a smoke screen to saddle upon America a type of government and a kind of economy entirely foreign and contrary to those we have ever known?
—Rep Dewey Short, (R, Mo.), quoted in Walter Trohan. “ ‘White House Harry’ Hopkins—A Modern Rasputin”, Chicago Daily Tribune, August 29, 1943
Hopkins is the leading admirer of Russia in the administration. He came back from his visits to Russia as personal envoy of the President singing the praises of Joe Stalin and the Russian system. In Russia he found the type of democracy he and the palace guard would like to see in America—one which would perpetuate them in office.
This mindset, and the forthright, sobering policy recommendations Yeaton would make as a result, conflicted starkly with those of FDR’s aptly-termed“Deputy President,” and overseer of the massive U.S. Lend Lease program of material support to the Soviet Union, Harry Hopkins. Yeaton’s encounter with Hopkins during the latter’s end of July, 1941 visit to the U.S. embassy in Moscow, which went from anticipatory elation, to shocked dismay, became the very inspiration for his Memoirs, as recorded on p. 2 of the Foreword:
The Harry Hopkins mission to Moscow in July of 1941 gave me the greatest professional shock of my entire career. Within hours after the arrival of Presidential Adviser Hopkins, I sensed that I was in trouble. Members of his mission, with one exception, ignored and avoided me whenever possible. It was as if a Mafia had met, and a “contract” had been put out on me.
When I realized that it was my observations, analyses, and conclusions, which I had forwarded through official channels to the Army chief of intelligence in Washington, that had caused both the British and the White House to blackball me, my first shock and bewilderment turned to anger. How could a series of reports, considered excellent by my military superiors [Note: Appendices 2 and 3 of the Memoirs contain War Department evaluations of Yeaton by his commanders, which document, repeatedly, the “superior value” of his work as an intelligence officer, which was “enthusiastically carried out.”], cause such a different reaction in the White House? I was determined to find out, and the results of my investigation are the basis for this manuscript.